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Abstract
Following recent calls for the development of a more embedded sense of labour agency, this
paper focuses on the scale of the workplace which is largely absent from recent labour geography
debates. Drawing on studies in the labour process tradition, the paper presents empirical
research on call centre work in Glasgow, utilising this to revisit the concept of local Labour
Control Regimes. We argue that rather than being simply imposed by capital and the state ‘from
above’, workplace control should be seen as the product of a dialectical process of interaction and
negotiation between management and labour. Labour’s indeterminacy can influence capital in case
specific ways as firms adapt to labour agency and selectively tolerate and collude with certain
practices and behaviours. Workers’ learned behaviours and identities are shown to affect not only
recruitment patterns in unexpected ways, but also modes of accepted conduct in call centres.
Accordingly, the case is made for the influence of subtle – yet pervasive – worker agency
expressed at the micro-scale of the labour process itself. This, it is argued, exerts a degree of
‘bottom-up’ pressure on key fractions of capital within the local Labour Control Regime.
Keywords
Labour agency, labour geography, labour process theory, local Labour Control Regime, call
centres
Introduction
Recent reviews of labour geography have pointed to the need to develop a more conditional
and embedded notion of agency (Coe, 2013; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011), moving beyond
the emphasis on labour agency in general that defined much of the foundational work in this
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field (see Herod, 2001). One prominent sphere that has been largely absent from such
discussions is the workplace. This is an important omission, given that workplaces are key
sites at which labour agency is exercised and expressed on a day-to-day basis (Rutherford,
2010). Adopting a workplace focus in this paper leads us to engage with industrial sociology
and labour process theory (LPT) which has been centrally concerned with the dynamics of
managerial control and employee ‘resistance’ at the point of production (Thompson and
Smith, 2009a). The persistence of autonomous labour practices in the face of various modes
of technical, bureaucratic and normative control is a recurring theme of this literature
(Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; Edwards, 1979; Taylor and Bain, 2003), resonating with
the labour geography problematic of worker agency (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011). In this
paper, we invert the typical direction of analysis in LPT research, starting from the rationales
and social backgrounds of workers and relating this to labour practices and managerial
control strategies.
While representing the central focus of LPT, the micro scale of the workplace is not, of
course, autonomous of broader social forces (Jaros, 2010: 81). This underlines the continuing
need to situate workplace-based accounts of labour agency in the context of local social
relations and labour market conditions (Lund-Thomsen, 2013). In order to provide a
theoretical framework for understanding the geographies of labour control, we turn to
Andrew Jonas’s (1996) theory of the local Labour Control Regime (LCR). This is defined
as a ‘stable local institutional framework for accumulation and labour regulation constructed
around local labour market reciprocities’ (Jonas, 1996: 323). Our primary focus in this paper
is the reciprocities negotiated between labour and capital at the site of production itself, rather
than the broader reciprocities between production, reproduction and consumption
highlighted by Jonas. We aim to present ‘a more nuanced view of the role of labour and
struggle in the development of local LCRs’ (Jonas, 1996: 332) through a grounded analysis of
workplace agency and control. This is designed to redress the rather ‘top-down’ account of
control that the local LCR concept has fostered. Informed by LPT research, we argue that
rather than being simply imposed by capital and the state ‘from above’, workplace control
should be seen as an on-going process of interaction and negotiation between management
and labour. This involves firms adapting to labour agency and selectively tolerating and
colluding with certain practices and behaviours (Nyberg and Sewell, 2014). As such, local
LCRs are subject to a range of influences that include the agency of labour as well as that of
capital and states.
We utilise a case study approach based on investigations of worker agency within three call
centres operating in Glasgow’s LCR. Both analytically and empirically this involves a return
to the point of production which Jonas originally vacated in favour of a broader institutional
perspective. Geographically, it represents a shift of spatial scale from local labour market
structures and institutions to individual workplaces as the primary units of analysis, although
we link this to aspects of the local LCR. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
First, we assess key strands of literature from labour geography, LPT and local LCR
research. This is followed by an outline of the empirical context of call centres in
Glasgow’s local LCR and the research methods employed. The remainder of the paper
presents the case study findings. The fourth section focuses on questions of labour supply
and recruitment, based upon compromises between management needs and labour
availability and skills. This is followed by an account of the effects of worker backgrounds
and social attributes on labour relations. The penultimate section discusses systems of
discipline and reward within each call centre case study, aimed at securing the longer term
consent of core workers. Finally, we draw out the broader implications of our findings in
conclusion.
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Agency, labour process theory and local Labour Control Regimes
The agency of workers to influence and shape space is at the heart of labour geography
(see Herod, 2001). This provided a necessary corrective to the pre-occupation with the power
of capital to make and break geographical landscapes that characterised earlier Marxist
work (see Harvey, 1982). As Castree (2007) argued, however, agency remained rather
under-theorised and under-specified in much labour geography, providing something of a
catch-all term that underpinned various forms of action. Castree’s call for a more
discriminating grasp of worker agency is echoed by more recent arguments for the
re-embedding of such agency (Coe, 2013; Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011). These seek to
re-embed labour agency in broad social arenas such as global production networks
(GPNs), the state, community politics and labour market intermediaries. One crucial
absence from these debates is the workplace (see Cumbers, 2015; Hastings, 2016;
Newsome et al., 2015; Rutherford, 2010). Accepting the argument that ‘labour agency is
always relational, and never completely autonomous’ (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011: 221),
this paper contends that the social, technical and organisational arrangements of the
workplace play an important role in shaping the routine operation and expression of such
agency. This is based upon an expanded conception of labour geography that draws upon
LPT to provide a more nuanced account of the local geographies of control (Bridi, 2013).
The roots of LPT lie in Braverman’s (1974) deskilling thesis, which fostered a broader
narrative of the degradation of work (Thompson and Smith, 2009a). The indeterminacy of
labour power is a core assumption of LPT, reflecting its embodiment in individual workers.
The imperative of releasing this power through productive labour underpins managerial
control strategies (Thompson and Smith, 2009a: 12). Smith (2006) adds a second
indeterminacy in the form of labour mobility between firms, creating additional
uncertainty for management (see Kiil and Knutsen, 2016). A second wave of studies were
conducted from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, emerging out of the responses to Braverman
and providing rich accounts of innovative control typologies and forms of resistance
(Edwards, 1979; Friedman, 1977). More recent work has broadened the scope of analysis,
reflecting changes in the organisation of work and the influence of ‘new economy’ narratives
emphasising knowledge, empowerment and consumption (Thompson and Smith, 2009a).
This has resulted in a growing cross-fertilisation of core LPT and post-structural themes
around questions of changing worker identities, power and the effects of new modes of
normative and cultural control (Jaros, 2010).
Recent work in the LPT tradition highlights how managerial control strategies tend to
come into contact with autonomous labour practices and behaviours (Ackroyd and
Thompson, 1999; Edwards et al., 2006; Mulholland, 2004; Taylor and Bain, 2003),
providing a deeper and more nuanced sense of workplace agency. In an important
contribution, Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 24) redefine the traditional notion of
resistance as ‘misbehaviour’, encompassing a range of ‘non-compliant’ or ‘counter-
productive’ practices.1 These are viewed as acts of appropriation by employees against four
main targets: work itself; materials used in work; time spent on work; and work identity
(Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). In Mulholland’s (2004) call centre study, for instance, the
appropriation of work translated into ‘slammin’ by workers, involving the faking of sales,
while the appropriation of work time was described as ‘scammin’. The commandeering of
work materials corresponds not only to traditional concerns about ‘pilfering’, but also the use
of work equipment such as computers for non-work purposes (Ackroyd and Thompson,
1999), while the appropriation of employee identities is more concerned with symbolic
resources, based upon the identities carried into or developed in the workplace. This often
requires firms to adapt and (at times) accommodate labour relations in view of social traits
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and attitudes developed outside the economic sphere (Peck, 1996; Rainnie et al., 2010). In
addition, several studies have emphasised the importance of workplace humour in the
development of organisational sub-cultures that often conflicts with corporate aims and
priorities (Taylor and Bain, 2003; cf. Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999).
The autonomous agency of labour in the workplace does not, however, necessarily
translate into ‘misbehaviour’ or opposition to management. Instead, as Edwards et al.
(2006: 126) argue, conflict and co-operation are ‘two sides of the same coin’ with managers
and workers having a shared interest in the prosperity of their enterprise. Subsequently,
Nyberg and Sewell (2014) identify three types of compromise between management and
labour in call centres. First, collaboration involves workers sharing management’s frame of
reference and is associated with a less intrusive form of control and greater worker discretion,
although this is ultimately viewed as an ‘illusory class compromise’ since collaboration brings
no discernible reward for call centre agents. Second, co-operation is based on a recognition of
a diversity of interests within an organisation, offering possibilities for the pursuit of shared
objectives. In their research this was evident in terms of how call centre agents accepted
surveillance and reduced discretion in exchange for the protection it offered against
customer complaints, alongside opportunities for management training. Third, collusion
requires both parties to deviate from the formal obligations of their positions, with
supervisors accepting a degree of rule-breaking in the interests of harmony and continued
production. Examples of such collusion included agents monitoring their own performance to
challenge official figures, the testing of new managers and the presence of a strong workplace
union in the support section of the call centre.
While recent reviews of LPT have rightly emphasised what Lund-Thomsen (2013) terms
the ‘vertical’ dimension of GPN governance in shaping the labour process (Taylor, 2015), it
is important to also emphasise the ‘horizontal’ dimension of local social relations and labour
market contexts, reflecting the local embeddedness of labour (Rainnie et al., 2010). This
informs our engagement with the local LCR concept which provides a spatial understanding
of labour control absent from LPT (Bridi, 2013). Closely informed by the regulation
approach (see Goodwin and Painter, 1996), Jonas’s local LCR theory built on the
growing call for more local analysis of labour-capital relations and regulatory
experimentation (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Storper and Walker, 1989). It focuses on
problems of controlling workers not only at the point of production, but also in the
linked spheres of reproduction and consumption (Jonas, 1996; Helms and Cumbers, 2006;
Cumbers et al., 2010). By way of solution, local LCRs provide stable, local institutional
frameworks for accumulation and labour regulation which are constructed through
reciprocities between these spheres (Jonas, 1996: 323).2 Jonas acknowledges the role of
labour agency through his notion of resistance, suggesting that it is often more evident at
sites of reproduction and consumption than places of production (Jonas, 1996: 328).
Although the local LCR framework has received largely intermittent attention within
labour geography, it has been the subject of some theoretical critique (Ellem and Shields,
1999; Helms and Cumbers, 2006). Ellem and Shields (1999), for instance, identified several
shortcomings in Jonas’s account, including the treatment of capital as the prime agent of
change and the underplaying of the role of both the state and organised labour. Labour
agency is reduced to resistance to local control practices, neglecting the more subtle forms of
non-oppositional agency uncovered by labour process research. The local LCR model fails
to incorporate the motivations and practices of workers in production who are present only
as passive subjects of control (Kelly, 2001).
At the same time, three approaches to the deployment of the local LCR concept in
empirically grounded research can be identified. The first is concerned with the relations
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between mobile capital and workers in the Global South. For instance, Kelly and Coe’s
work in South-East Asia emphasises the fluid mechanisms of worker control that are enacted
by local and national state actors to attract and service mobile capital (Coe and Kelly, 2002;
Kelly, 2001, 2002). At the same time their emphasis on structural constraints and the
organising power of firms, recruitment agencies and local governments under-plays the
role of worker agency in inhabiting, adapting and at times challenging the local LCR
from below. Following Jonas’s original conception of labour resistance, a second strand is
concerned with tensions and discontents across the spheres of production, reproduction and
consumption (see Ellem, 2003; Helms and Cumbers, 2006; Wills, 2001).
A third set of studies are more concerned with labour processes at the workplace scale in
the context of local social relations. For example, Bridi (2013) shows how migrant
agricultural workers in Ontario use game-play and competition to mitigate their
experience of control. Another study argues that factory workers utilise connections with
the church to undermine quality controllers in the firm (Neethi, 2012). In addition, Sportel’s
(2013) account of coconut workers in India demonstrates how workers operating in marginal
enclaves rework caste identities to adopt forms of work beyond their traditional social roles.
Through these practices, workers can carve out sufficient space within local LCR
arrangements to meet their needs, helping to limit and at least partly defuse class
antagonisms in the local LCR (Kelly, 2001). Informed by this broader discussion of the
geographies of labour control, we now turn to our study of call centres in Glasgow.
The Glasgow local LCR and call centres
Critical academic appraisals of call centre work have emphasised issues of low pay, unstable
conditions and the stressful natureof thework,baseduponclose technological andbureaucratic
control of the labour process (Taylor andBain, 1999; Taylor andBain, 2003). At the same time,
call centre work typically requires emotional labour which, like much customer facing work in
the new service economy, is seen to favour certain segments of the labour force (in particular
female and younger workers). Complimenting these findings, comparative cross-national
institutional analysis has underlined the low pay and mundane nature of UK call centre
work in particular (Batt et al., 2009; Doellgast et al., 2009; Lloyd et al., 2010). Lloyd et al.
(2010: 43) attribute this to national-level institutions and regulatory frameworks with the
presence of trade unions and work councils viewed as the key to developing higher skilled
labour processes and securing better rates of pay (Taylor and Bain, 2001).
In pursuit of low cost and abundant pools of labour, call centre work has become
concentrated in many of the old industrial areas of the UK, superseding the previous
layers of investment based upon branch plant manufacturing and heavy industries
(Bishop et al., 2003; Richardson et al., 2000). Reflecting this broader trend, call centres
have developed a strong concentration in Glasgow, spurred also by financial incentives
and the availability of low-cost accommodation (Taylor and Anderson, 2012: 24).
A ‘critical mass’ of 117 centres were recorded in the broader ‘travel-to-work’ area in 2011,
employing 31,405 workers which is estimated to account for 12.2% of Glasgow’s total
employment (Taylor, 2015; Taylor and Anderson, 2012).
Accordingly, the industry has emerged as a strategic component within Glasgow’s
increasingly workfare-oriented local LCR (Helms and Cumbers, 2006), with call centres
promoted as a means of absorbing segments of the local workless population. For
instance, Cumbers et al. (2009) have shown how jobcentre staff have sought to promote
call centre work to job-seekers, addressing the ‘cultural lag’ of continued aspirations for
traditional ‘blue collar’ manual work among young males in particular (see Hudson, 2005).
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In addition, economic development agency Scottish Enterprise pioneered the Calling
Scotland and Calling Glasgow job fair campaigns in the early 2000s in order to improve
the local image of call centres. This included the targeting of residents in areas of high
unemployment.
Since Helms and Cumbers (2006) first emphasised the key role of call centre work in
Glasgow’s local LCR – with high turnover posited as the main resistance strategy of workers
– more recent research has revealed a fall in temporary contracts from 27.4% in 1997 to just
5.3% in 2011 and a rise in full-time contracts from 65.5% to 76.9% over the same period
(Taylor and Anderson, 2012; see Table 1).3 This trend towards permanent fulltime work in
call centres has coincided with a shrinking gender divide (cf. Belt, 2002), with the proportion
of female workers falling from 67.4% in 1997 to 58.1% in 20113 (see Scholarios and Taylor,
2011). While they highlight changing trends in call centre employment, these survey results
tell us little about the organisational contexts in which such changes occur and the practices
and backgrounds of call centre workers in Glasgow’s local LCR.
With this in mind, a case study methodology was adopted to address questions of
workplace agency and control in Glasgow call centres, primarily from the perspective
of workers.4 The selection of case study centres was based on access and sectoral
considerations. ‘Candidate’ cases were identified from discussion with contacts
representing key sectors of the local call centre industry.5 Initial access hinged on
preliminary discussions with management from eight call centres, with those offering the
greatest levels of access preferred over those imposing access restrictions.6 The three cases
selected for in-depth study were: a public sector/ local authority call centre, ‘Gov-Tel’
(a sector representing 13.4% of Scotland’s total call centre workforce); a ‘high end’
computer/information technology (IT) support centre, ‘Game-Tel’ (representing 3.9% of
the total call centre workforce); and a telesales operation supporting a variety of industry
clients, ‘Sales-Com’ (a grouping which covers 13.3% of the Scottish call centre workforce
under the ‘various’ label) (see Table 1). Of the three, Gov-Tel was the most locally rooted
and least spatially stretched supply chain model, operating as a local service centre for
Glasgow residents. In contrast, Game-Tel and Sales-Com performed a remote customer
service for third party clients with customers and sales leads drawn from across the UK
and Europe.
A total of 69 interviews were conducted with staff across the division of labour, though
mainly telephone agents, in addition to non-participant observation based on repeat visits to
each operation. We now turn to examine labour practices in the three call centres, beginning
with a discussion of recruitment patterns and the motives of staff.
Table 1. Call centre case studies.
Industry sector Main activities Union
Number
of workers Opening hours Churn
Sales-Com Outsourcer: Various Outbound sales
(various)
No 100 9 a.m.–7 p.m.
(Mon–Fri)
40%
Gov-Tel Public sector Inbound customer
service
Yes 130 24 h/7 days 14%
Game-Tel Outsourcer: Computer
games and IT
Inbound technical
support
No 35 7 a.m.–8 p.m.
Mon–Fri
26%
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Staffing Glasgow’s call centres
In contrast to the perception of staffing patterns in the call centre industry as generic and
standardised (see Connell and Burgess, 2006; Davies, 2010), divergent forms of recruitment
were evident in each centre. Game-Tel placed the greatest emphasis on traditional indicators
of human capital and recruited on a basis of IT work experience, qualifications and the
language ability of candidates. Conversely, the main skill sought in Sales-Com staff was the
ability to ‘push’, persuade and sell to customers. This resulted in staffing criteria based not
on conventional human capital requirements, but on attitudinal factors associated with
enthusiasm and tenacity to sell (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002). By contrast,
management at Gov-Tel sought emotional attributes associated with ‘caring’ so as to
respond effectively to the queries and needs of service users (authors’ interviews). Both
Game-Tel and Sales-Com utilised recruitment agencies to screen for these abilities and, in
theory, to allow for fast replacements of staff where necessary. Corresponding interview
assessment techniques focused heavily on the speaking skills of applicants.
Worker traits and backgrounds also varied considerably both across and within the
centres. In Game-Tel’s case, a large proportion of workers had technical support
backgrounds and more ‘careerist’ aspirations in line with this background. The centre also
drew on a migrant division of labour due to its language requirements and the scarcity of
local workers with foreign language skills (Table 2). This resulted in agents originating from
a number of European countries in addition to some Scottish workers. By contrast, Gov-Tel
and Sales-Com drew on a pre-dominantly Scottish workforce from in and around Glasgow
(Table 2). In Sales-Com this included a mainstay of younger agents (18–24) with service
industry backgrounds in contrast to a large number of older workers in Gov-Tel. The
majority of agents in Sales-Com, particularly in the higher-end sales campaigns, were
male, reflecting broader patterns of gender segmentation in call centres (Russell, 2008).
Although the majority of service workers in Gov-Tel were female, the centre also
employed a significant proportion of working class men. Several in this latter workforce
held long histories of local authority employment having transferred from other departments
in the council.
While workers’ motives for selecting call centre work have received limited attention in
the literature, our research uncovered specific subjective rationales that were often associated
with the places workers came from and their life-stage (Munro et al., 2009). Explaining the
Table 2. Call centre core staff, norms, and inducements.
Call Centre Core staff Imported norms and practices Inducements to perform
Game-Tel Skilled migrants;
Middle class
Conational interactions;
gameplay; reticence to
targets/work intensification
Self-selection of team layouts;
lack of dress-code
Tolerance of under-performing
agents
Gov-Tel Glaswegians (older)
Working class
Masculine behaviour
(off phone); slang/selectively
course language (on phone)
Loyalty to longstanding agents;
disciplining of workers
on their own terms
(e.g. ‘shut-up’/‘get on with it’)
Sales-Com Glaswegians (younger)
Working class
Masculine, competitive
language/behaviours; pranks/
camaraderie
Bonus culture with prizes and
awards
Attempts to cultivate a generally
‘fun’ atmosphere
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uptake of call centre work by both genders, and those with contrasting class backgrounds,
requires an understanding of both place-specific influences and broader structural
determinants (Hanson and Pratt, 1995). One common view held by male workers with
limited qualifications and work experience was succinctly put by Leon of Sales-Com:
You come out of school so you’ve got to work somewhere, in unskilled work, so what options
have you got in Glasgow? You could work restaurants . . . but you’re always going to get
minimum wage for that. You could work bar work – but that’s the same again, and that’s
long unsociable hours where you’re working Saturdays . . . or you could work in a shop, which
is bollocks . . . and you’re not gonna go anywhere with that. (Leon, Agent, Sales-Com)
This view of call centres as the ‘best of a bad lot’ of low paying service roles arose repeatedly
in interviews with the younger segment of employees and students (Munro et al., 2009;
Smith, 2005). It can be seen as a response to the constraints imposed by local labour
market conditions in terms of the limited alternative employment opportunities available
to this group of workers (Smith, 2005). Rather than identifying positively with the role – in
accordance with the control strategies of management and institutional actors (for example,
local government, development agencies and jobcentres) – these younger workers regarded
call centre employment as part of a broad ‘work to live’ philosophy associated with
maximising earnings for socialising and consumption at evenings and weekends. This
hedonistic motivation for call centre work contrasted with the outlook of older segments
of the labour force working at Gov-Tel who often identified call centre work as potentially
‘challenging’ and ‘different’ from previous experiences of manual work, and the more
‘careerist’ standpoints held by many within Game-Tel (see above).
Contrary to the ‘ideal’ candidates sought by management, recruitment patterns reflected
supply-side difficulties operating beneath the surface of the local LCR. These difficulties
meant that management often had to compromise its standards in practice:
At the moment it’s a trade-off . . . even if they’re pretty poor at what they’re doing the fact we
need the language means they’ve got the job. If we had to replace them, we then have to pay a
recruitment fee, train them up and whatever, so there’s that short term cost of recruitment and
training time – and probably we’d rather save that. (Manager, Game-Tel)
Accordingly, management at Game-Tel acknowledged that performance issues with workers
proved difficult to address due to the scarcity of qualified replacements available locally.
Similarly, Sales-Com’s focus on a secondary workforce of younger, under-qualified
applicants stemmed from difficulties managing workers with past telesales/marketing
experience – ostensibly one of the benefits of locating in a call centre ‘hub’ (Taylor, 2015)
– as many had fixed perspectives on how a sale should be conducted ‘or how the call centre
should be run’ (authors’ interviews). In addition, those with career histories of call centre
employment were often perceived as uncommitted to the role due to their propensity to ‘hop’
from one centre to another in the Glasgow area. This reflects the second indeterminacy of
labour in terms of its mobility between firms (Kiil and Knutsen, 2016; Smith, 2006) which is
perceived to be higher among more experienced call centre workers (in particular those who
have shown a willingness to work in many different operations). By contrast, management
spoke positively of younger workers, emphasising their malleable, committed nature (‘some
centres will tell you ‘‘never take a school leaver’’ – cobblers!’), and others with limited
qualifications but the right attitude for sales and learning on the job (authors’ interviews).
This discussion of staffing compromise is significant in the context of local LCR theory,
challenging assumptions that capital and the state determine patterns of recruitment and
employment in key sectors of the local economy (Helms and Cumbers, 2006; Jonas, 1996).
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A labour-centred account which incorporates both the motivations of workers and
management’s responses offers a more balanced account of the job-filling stage of the
employment relationship. It also provides a more concrete and spatialised understanding
of worker’s rationales and social backgrounds relative to the rather abstract and placeless
accounts of labour agency and opposition often found in LPT (Bridi, 2013; Sportel, 2013). In
the following sections, we develop this perspective on worker-management relations at the
point of production. This involves a return to the notion of a necessary reciprocity between
capital and labour negotiated on an ongoing basis (Jonas, 1996).
Workplace practices and behaviours
Observations of staff behaviour in each centre captured a range of informal practices and
norms within the call centre labour process. In both Gov-Tel and Sales-Com, these included
forms of masculine behaviour that fitted uneasily with the feminine stereotype of call centre
work (Table 2) (Russell, 2008: 207). In the case of Gov-Tel, masculine performances both
‘front’ (i.e. on call) and ‘back’ stage (Crang, 1994; Goffman, 1990) echoed practices more
akin to manufacturing work. Male agents from working class backgrounds engaged in
activities such as ‘slaggin’ off the lassies’ to help the passage of time, in addition to other
loutish practices such as shouting, swearing and impersonating (typically upper-class)
customers on a regular basis off-phone (Mulholland, 2004; Taylor and Bain, 2003). While
the workers engaged in such acts typically failed to gain promotion from a role on the
phones, the durability of these practices is indicative of management’s struggle to impart
‘idealized’ standards of etiquette from above (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001), pointing to
the existence of distinct sub-cultures in the call centre (Taylor and Bain, 2003).
Practices in Sales-Com also bore the hallmarks of masculine behaviour, due primarily to
the reliance on young working class males with ‘Glaswegian patter’ applied to the cause of
selling. As with McDowell’s (1997) experience of masculine work culture in merchant banks,
several male agents here utilised sexualised and sporting language to describe their role and
mark the centre as one congruent with male traits of ‘individualism, aggression, competition,
sport and drinking’ (Table 2) (Collinson and Hearn, 1994: 4; McDowell, 1997). Accordingly,
one team leader remarked:
I would say if I was going to stereotype it’s a lot like a football team. You wouldn’t have a girl in
a guy’s dressing room during a football match, you know what I mean? It’s a lot of . . . (Pauses
and makes a straining noise as if pushing) ‘Come on!’ . . . .you know what I mean? (Male team
leader, Sales-Com)
Sales-Com’s top sales campaign/workflow7 was staffed wholly by males with an interest in
football, who socialised outside of work and frequently attended matches home and away. In
a similar sense to those with factory backgrounds in Gov-Tel, informal relations and
practices on the team involved ‘whipping boys’, pranks and camaraderie typically not
associated with white collar and/or feminine forms of service work which marked this
sales team out from less prestigious workflows in the centre (cf. Ackroyd and Thompson,
1999; Taylor and Bain, 2003). These practices contrasted with a quieter call centre floor at
Game-Tel in which staff passed time in-between calls through a combination of online
research and video game-play (intended for both recreation and knowledge building
purposes).
Management’s tolerance of this overtly masculine behaviour (in two of the three centres)
reflects a form of adaptation by capital to labour in an effort to forge reciprocities
at the workplace scale (Jonas, 1996). Management’s struggle to impart cultural norms
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in a ‘top-down’ fashion stemmed from difficulties dictating work behaviours to core
staff members with learned behaviours, subjectivities and non-work identities. These
behaviours reflect place-based, non-work attachments and norms, which often require
firms to adapt to, and even accommodate, work practices based on social identities and
attitudes developed outside the economic sphere (Peck, 1996; Rainnie et al., 2010). As
Maguire (1988) notes:
It is the interaction between ‘work’ and ‘non-work’ which is important. In the study of
social control in the workplace it is neither solely the external environment nor the ‘internal
state’ of the workplace which requires examination, but the interpenetration of the two.
(Maguire, 1988: 72)
While the need for adaptation and the incorporation of labour practices on the part of
capital was initially recognised by Jonas (1996), few subsequent local LCR studies have
pursued this agenda, reflecting the prevalent assumption that workers adapt to the control
strategies of capital and local state institutions. In addition, the focus on investigating
relations between the linked spheres of consumption, reproduction and production has
impaired the ability of local LCR research to interrogate workplace cultures and practices
operating at the point of production. From an LPT perspective, by contrast, the tendency
for call centre management to adapt to the labour practices and traits outlined above can be
seen as a form of collusion as capital tolerates certain forms of acceptable misbehaviour in
the interests of continued production and workplace harmony (see below) (Nyberg and
Sewell, 2014).
Control, discipline and reward
Reflecting the behavioural practices outlined above, this section extends the analysis of
adaptation and collusion, arguing that labour agency contributes to the coproduction of
control relations vis-a`-vis discipline and reward structures (see Table 2). This again reflects
capital’s need to accommodate and retain potentially mobile workers through forms of
workplace compromise (Kiil and Knutsen, 20168; Smith, 2006). In general, adjustments to
regimes of discipline and reward may be interpreted to have ‘mellowed’ in line with the
improved contractual status of workers in Scotland’s call centre industry as a whole (Taylor
and Anderson, 2012). Neither Gov-Tel nor Game-Tel placed strong emphasis on targets
when assessing staff performance (for example, in judging call quality or number of calls
taken), focusing instead on attendance and timekeeping. This move was designed, in the
words of one manager, to make the operation ‘less like a call centre’, and more in line with
dignified forms of office work in which older workers in particular would not feel patronised
or pressurised to perform (see Mulholland, 2004).
Similarly, workers at Game-Tel were not incentivised on the basis of performance, a
factor which one agency recruiter put down to management’s respect for cultural
differences between British and (continental) European workers:
Well, this whole thing about being ‘seller of the week’ and getting some booze for it, or a little
medal – I think foreigners are not receptive to that. I think we take that as a little bit patronising
and British people probably less so. In Game-Tel it’s an incentive they wouldn’t do, we would
have run away thinking ‘what the hell is this?!’ (Former Agent, Game-Tel)
Game-Tel management further reciprocated a perceived need for laid back clothing policies,
endorsing a permanent ‘dressed-down’ approach as well as liberal attitudes to staff activities
between calls. This should not signify an absence of conflict between agents and
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management, as indicated by the latter’s struggle to intensify the labour process during
periods of peak demand. As one team leader remarked:
Sometimes when you’ve actually needed to be quite rough, to meet the results or the
requirements and to get things done. Then it’s not as good because they’re not used to it and
they all get really pissed off – and leave . . . I don’t care if people come in in half ripped jeans but
when they’re sitting at work I would like them to do their job more of the time than sitting
talking to their friends or playing internet games. (Team Leader, Game-Tel)
Under this relaxed working culture, workers were also allowed to ‘self-select’ their team
arrangements based on language and cultural ‘fit’. While this allowed easy communication
between workers, helping them to deal with challenging calls or issues encountered in the
role, it also created distinctive sub-cultures in the organisation which management
subsequently struggled to infiltrate and monitor (Taylor and Bain, 2003).
By contrast, Sales-Com’s culture made direct linkage to the youthfulness of the
workforce, as epitomised by a culture of ‘fun’ and reward delivered most overtly via
quarterly themed events and award ceremonies (see Kinnie et al., 2000 and Table 2).
Through these events, top performers were rewarded with trophy shields, bottles of
alcohol and a limited number of holiday prizes. While several workers – notably those
male agents on the most prestigious sales team – spoke positively of these efforts, other
interviewees also spoke of ‘gimmicks’ designed to generate enthusiasm, loyalty and consent
from younger segments of the workforce (Mulholland, 2004). Ultimately these efforts reflect
a strategy on the part of management to both encourage sales and exercise control through
the creation of a stimulating work environment geared to the core workforce, without
causing significant costs for the centre (for example, through wage increases).
While this approach was ostensibly tailored to a younger workforce, with rewards
associated with achievement against objective sales targets, staff in Sales-Com continued
to detect the influence of shared social identities and place attachments on progress within
the centre. Several agents thought that non-work backgrounds mattered in determining
patterns of promotion, a factor seen to benefit working class males over other segments
of the workforce. Interviewees spoke of the difficulty of breaking into higher end sales
campaigns (i.e. more autonomous and financially rewarding roles) based upon social
relations and identities developed both outside and inside the call centre:
I went to him (a campaign manager) ‘I’m struggling, I’ve got a new flat, I need a better wage’
– he was a St. Mirren fan and I’m a [Partick] Thistle fan, so he was thinking ‘oh fancy West-
Ender’ – and he just put me straight back on the phones, he didn’t even give me the option . . . .
(Agent, Sales-Com)9
It’s very hard to get in (the top sales campaign), and it’s ‘jobs for the boys’ almost, you’ve got
that coming in . . . you’ve got to be kind of friendly with them (management) and work your way
in . . . Personalities go a long way. (Agent, Sales-Com)
Interviewees also spoke of the ‘sneaky’ ways in which jobs were advertised and filled based
on friendships and rapport with key gatekeepers in management; often on the basis of shared
backgrounds and ‘cultural fit’ in addition to objective sales ability. Similar non-work factors
such as places of origin and associations with schools and football clubs were also used
as markers of class, deemed to influence career progress in the centre (Sennett and
Cobb, 1972). These insights point to the limitations of labour agency in Glasgow call
centres, which is generally more evident in the development of everyday practices and
relations than in patterns of work allocation and promotion that are more closely
controlled by management.
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In Gov-Tel, adaptations of work organisation and culture were deemed necessary
by management to integrate workers with distinct (and arguably ill-fitting) class
backgrounds, work histories and corresponding attitudes to customer facing service work.
For example, rather than disciplining the masculine and working class practices invoked by
agents, Team Leaders in Gov-Tel were expected to show ‘street smarts’ by treating
indiscretions through similarly boorish rebuttals (see Table 2). In order to match the lexicon
of agents, in Gov-Tel this often translated as Team Leaders telling agents to ‘shut up’ and ‘get
on with it’. Management actively encouraged supervisors to deal with rowdy agents in this
fashion, often to the chagrin of those workers (both agents and supervisors) with ‘white collar’
workhistories and expectations of officeworkdemeanour.This incorporationof, and collusion
with, core worker habits (Nyberg and Sewell, 2014) would seem to be preferable to ‘despotic’
forms of control (e.g. disciplinary action for unprofessional conduct) which arguably
contributed to the higher rates of labour turnover emphasised by Helms and Cumbers
(2006) in the initial round of call centre growth in the local LCR. This illustrates the point
that labour segmentation not only creates distinct organisational sub-cultures in the
workplace, but also that segments of the workforce (in particular core workers) can shape
workplace norms and influence associated control relations (Taylor and Bain, 2003).
Like several of the call centre agents, many of themanagers inGov-Tel held long histories of
local authority/council employment, and empathised with working class agents from similar
backgrounds. In addition, working class (predominantly male) agents brought both
quantitative flexibility (e.g. a willingness to switch shifts/work extra hours at short notice)
and a ‘cultural congruence’ (Taylor, 2015) to the customer interaction, incorporating both
practical local knowledge and related class and place-based rapport with customers.
Management cited these workers as loyal to the operation, underscoring the point that
labour mobility remains a threat to call centre efficiency which management are prepared to
counter through elements of collusionwith apparent ‘misbehaviour’ (Ackroyd andThompson,
1999; Nyberg and Sewell, 2014). This involved a degree of acceptance of unorthodox norms
and practices bymanagement, and inadvertently allowed aworking class identity to carry over
intoGov-Tel as awhole.As one trainer remarked, ‘it all comes down tobackground . . . it’s very
difficult to try and coach someone out of their own personality’ (authors’ interview).
In addition to more formal forms of conflict between labour and capital, some labour
process research suggests that workers compete to imprint their own subjective cultural
visions on the workplace (Hodson, 1995; Roy, 1973). The above points are indicative not
only of the struggle to align different worker backgrounds and associated etiquettes
(Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999), but also of Herod’s contention that workers conflict with
one another to produce economic space in their desired image (Herod, 2001; Hastings, 2016).
Froma local LCRperspective, this point again underscores the decisions that firmsmay take to
adapt and alter labour control practices ‘to fit the dominant social relations and power
structures of the locality’ (Jonas, 1996: 331). In this case, accounts of collusion with worker
habits in the labour process (Nyberg and Sewell, 2014) also help to indicate how fresh layers of
service capital encounter and negotiate pre-existing social relations and class identities
inherited from the preceding era of industrial capitalism (Hudson, 2005).
Conclusion
In response to recent calls for a more conditional and embedded notion of agency in labour
geography (see Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011), this paper has examined how labour agency
operates at the scale of the workplace (Rutherford, 2010). While capital may ultimately
secure a substantial degree of control in workplaces, we have shown how this practice is at
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least partly co-producedwith labour and shaped by contingent local conditions. As Storper and
Walker (1989: 166) argue, ‘workers and managers together manufacture social worlds
in miniature in the workplace, the firm and across industries. No one creates these worlds
entirely by design’. In practice, this paper has shown that both control and work experience
emerge out of a dialectical process of interaction between management practices and worker
expectations, attitudes and social backgrounds. With call centre management unable
(or unwilling) to invest in a thorough training or ‘re-socialising’ of labour, workers are
allowed to reproduce incongruent behaviours, based upon the need to create ‘tolerable
conditions under which employees and employers can rub along together without the whole
edifice collapsing into acrimony and open conflict’ (Nyberg and Sewell, 2014: 327). This may
lead firms to collude with tolerable forms of apparent misbehaviour and adapt their modes of
labour control to accommodate the attributes of core workers recruited locally (Nyberg and
Sewell, 2014).
The above discussion has pointed to the benefits of a more spatially enlivened LPT analysis,
illustrating (some of) the ways in which geographic inquiry can enrich understandings of
labour process struggles and worker agency. Building on previous calls for spatial analysis
in LPT (Coe, 2015; Rainnie et al., 2010; Thompson and Smith, 2009b), we have shown how
local labour market conditions and workers’ backgrounds, reflecting different degrees of local
social embeddedness, can affect both work performance and labour practices. This highlights
the variety of ways in which different groups of workers engage with what has been seen as a
standardised call centre labour process (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; Taylor et al., 2002).
Our analysis has shown not only the distinctiveness of a ‘Glasgow workforce’, but also the
diversity of workers’ motives for undertaking call centre work, reflecting their work histories
and perceptions of local labour market conditions. In turn, this diversity – involving the
integration of workers from different places and backgrounds – complicates the notion of a
‘generic’ form of work integral to the local LCR. While call centres have been promoted as a
means of absorbing workers from across the social spectrum, particularly in old industrial
areas (Cumbers et al., 2009), in practice these social backgrounds influence the labour process
and workplace relations in unexpected ways.
While we have unpacked the Glasgow LCR by showing that it is far from singular and
subject to worker-driven change at the micro-level, this should not be taken to imply that it is
unstable ‘as a whole’. On the contrary, the focus on the micro-practices of workers allows us to
better identify subtle adaptations on the part of capital which may actually help to reinforce
the coherence of the local LCR by developing stronger relationships with core workers. This is
a part of the process of capital embedding itself in the locality which arguably provides for
longer term stability in the local LCR. While labour exploitation undoubtedly persists in a
range of forms (for example, low autonomy, poor wages and job insecurity), there is evidence
of capital accommodating core workers’ attributes and practices. As emphasised earlier, this is
more apparent for the day-to-day labour process than broader modes of work allocation and
career progression which are controlled by management. Nonetheless, worker agency involves
more than simply coping with the lived realities of call centre work; labour’s social nature
influences capital in locally specific ways as part of the on-going process of embedding
particular fractions of capital in specific places.
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Notes
1. Although, as Belanger and Thuderoz (2010: 137) observe, this formulation implies that behaviour is
itself intrinsic and rather singular in terms of compliance with managerial norms.
2. It is our understanding that labour control on the part of capital is a necessary and universal
tendency within the capitalist mode of production, reflecting the indeterminacy of labour, but
whether or not this is translated into a stable and coherent LCR is a contingent matter that
depends upon the ability of local actors to foster reciprocities between the spheres of
reproduction, consumption and production (Jonas, 1996).
3. While these figures are for call centres in Scotland, Glasgow is the most important location by far,
accounting for 34.9 per cent of call centre employment in Scotland (Taylor and Anderson, 2012).
4. Research into the role of line managers and the broader Human Resource Management (HRM)
function in call centres has acknowledged the role of adaptation on the part of call centremanagement
in order to alleviate tensions with the workforce (see Connell and Hannif, 2009; Harney and Jordan,
2008). Rather than focussing on formal HRM functions as drivers of workplace change, our focus in
the paper is on acknowledging the role of workers themselves in shifting management/supervisor
approaches to control, including allowances for changes in workplace culture, and associated forms
of mitigation with a view to managing worker-management tensions.
5. This included early research interviews with representatives from Scottish Enterprise, the Scottish
Trade Union Congress (STUC) and other unions concerned with call centre employment issues.
Scottish Enterprise provided contact details of a number of call centre managers based in the
Glasgow area.
6. One call centre in the banking sector raised concerns over data protection issues, while two of the
initial call centre contacts indicated that prior consent would be required from higher layers of
management.
7. A workflow represents a structured set of tasks, designed to produce specified outputs which are
oriented towards particular markets (see Taylor et al., 2002: 135). For instance, ‘low-value, low-
skill’ operations with high call volumes often involve standardised and highly scripted workflows.
8. Kiil and Knutsen (2016) identify a form of ‘agency by exit’ linked to the case of Swedish graduate
nurses and the ‘Not below 24,000’ movement. In striving for this baseline wage, campaigns were
coordinated to encourage graduates not to accept jobs paying below 24,000 SK in the Swedish
health sector. Driven in part by this campaigning, and the high numbers accepting (better paying)
nursing roles in neighbouring Norway, this strategy ultimately was seen to produce higher wages for
graduate nurses in the Swedish labour market.
9. Here, attachments to particular football clubs are regarded as stereotyped indicators of social
class and background, with Partick Thistle seen as representative of middle-class residents and
students in the affluent West End of Glasgow, in contrast to St Mirren as representing working
class Paisley.
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